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Abstract
During decision making, individuals are prone to rely on external cues such as expert advice when the outcome is not known.
However, the electrophysiological correlates associated with outcome uncertainty and the use of expert advice are not completely
understood. The feedback-related negativity (FRN), P3a, and P3b are event-related brain potentials (ERPs) linked to dissociable
stages of feedback and attentional processing during decision making. Even though these ERPs are influenced by both reward-
and punishment-related feedback, it remains unclear how extrinsic information during uncertainty modulates these brain poten-
tials. In this study, the effects of advice cues on decision making were investigated in two separate experiments. In the first
experiment, electroencephalography (EEG) was recorded in healthy volunteers during a decision-making task in which the
participants received reward or punishment feedback preceded by novice, amateur, or expert advice. The results showed that
the P3a component was significantly influenced by the subjective predictive value of an advice cue, whereas the FRN and P3b
were unaffected by the advice cues. In the second, sham-controlled experiment, cathodal transcranial direct current stimulation
(ctDCS) was administered in conjunction with EEG in order to explore the direct contributions of the frontal cortex to these brain
potentials. Results showed no significant change in either advice-following behavior or decision times. However, ctDCS did
decrease FRN amplitudes as compared to sham, with no effect on the P3a or P3b. Together, these findings suggest that advice
information may act primarily on attention allocation during feedback processing, whereas the electrophysiological correlates of
the detection and updating of internal prediction models are not affected.
Keywords Advice information . Decision making . Electroencephalogram . Feedback processing . Transcranial direct current
stimulation
Decision making is a multifaceted process associated with eval-
uating and selecting among a finite set of alternatives on the
basis of probability and outcome (Lee, 2013). Both implicit and
explicit forms of knowledge are used to reduce uncertainty and
maximize the likelihood of making the correct choice. An im-
portant source of explicit knowledge that guides decision mak-
ing during uncertainty comes from expert advice. This is advice
that is subjectively perceived as a reliable predictor of the de-
sired outcome (Sniezek, Schrah, & Dalal, 2004), which has
been further illustrated by results showing that even good
decision-makers remain biased toward the opinions of experts
(Cook, den Ouden, Heyes, & Cools, 2014; Harvey & Fischer,
1997). The usefulness of advice is determined by its predictive
value in terms of rewards and punishments (Bonaccio & Dalal,
2006). Yet how advice affects the cortical processing underlying
decision making is still poorly understood.
It is assumed that during feedback processing, an internal
prediction model is used to evaluate the current feedback. On
the basis of errors in the prediction, this model can be further
refined. Electroencephalography (EEG) studies have identified
event-related potential (ERP) components that are associated
with different stages of feedback processing (Baker & Holroyd,
2011; Cavanagh, Masters, Bath, & Frank, 2014; Enriquez-
Geppert, Konrad, Pantev, & Huster, 2010). First, an internal
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prediction model detects a mismatch between the expected and
actual outcomes. The fronto-central midline feedback-related
negativity (FRN) is associated with such error detection
(Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Ullsperger, Fischer, Nigbur, &
Endrass, 2014). Furthermore, several studies have indicated that
the FRN is affected by the valence and magnitude of rewards, as
well as by the context in which the rewards are presented
(Bellebaum, Polezzi, & Daum, 2010; Holroyd, Larsen, &
Cohen, 2004; Wu & Zhou, 2009).
Source localization studies have indicated that the neural
generator of the FRN lies in the anterior cingulate cortex
(ACC; Bocquillon et al., 2014; Hauser et al., 2014;
Ullsperger et al., 2014). In addition, functional magnetic reso-
nance imaging (fMRI) studies have supported the importance
of the ACC in reward and punishment processing, together
with the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and ventral striatum
(Beckmann, Johansen-Berg, & Rushworth, 2009; Rogers
et al., 2004). There is increasing evidence that the neural activ-
ity in these regions during reward processing is modulated by
the presence of expert information (Engelmann, Capra,
Noussair, & Berns, 2009; Engelmann, Moore, Capra, &
Berns, 2012; Meshi, Biele, Korn, & Heekeren, 2012; Tomlin,
Nedic, Prentice, Holmes, & Cohen, 2013). Hemodynamic ac-
tivity in the OFC has been shown to increase when advice is
more likely to change one’s initial opinion in favor of following
the expert’s opinion (Meshi et al., 2012). Furthermore, the OFC
has been shown to reflect the subjective value of rewards and
external information (Padoa-Schioppa & Cai, 2011; Peters &
Büchel, 2010). These results indicate that the OFC is involved
in processing the subjective valuation of advice cues, in which
seemingly more informative cues are associated with increased
OFC activity and, hence, increased following behavior (Meshi
et al., 2012). In contrast, Suen, Brown, Morck, and Silverstone
(2014) showed increased ACC activity when financially disad-
vantageous expert advice was opposed, providing a possible
way to override following advice. Therefore, whether advice is
followed may depend on a balance between the urge to follow
experts, mediated by OFC activity, and the actual benefits of
following advice, mediated by ACC activity. In addition to
cortical structures, this balance determining the subjective val-
ue of a cue has also been associated with activity in the ventral
striatum (Meshi et al., 2012).
Following the detection of a mismatch between the expect-
ed and actual outcomes the prediction model is updated to
make the model more accurate for future feedback. A parietal
positive deflection that can be observed between 300 and
600 ms (P300) after reward- and punishment-related feedback
is associated with these processes (Goldstein et al., 2006). The
P300 component is associated with attention allocation and
consists of two subcomponents, the P3a and P3b (Polich,
2007). It has been proposed that the P3a reflects a process of
novelty detection (Polich, 2007). Studies have indicated that
the amplitude of the P3a is influenced by the expectedness of
feedback (Donchin & Coles, 1988; Donchin, Ritter &
McCallum, 1978), as well as by the magnitude of the reward
or punishment (Sato et al., 2005; Wu & Zhou, 2009). On the
basis of these observations, the allocation of attention toward
relevant information accompanies a higher P3a amplitude
(Polich, 2007). In accordance, neuroimaging studies have re-
lated the P300 to the fronto-parietal attention network
(Bengson, Kelley, & Mangun, 2015; Pfabigan et al., 2014).
Fronto-parietal network activity, it is proposed, is directly in-
fluenced by the amount of uncertainty during decision making
(Kopp et al., 2016; Paulus et al., 2001). Expert advice can
increase confidence in a decision, especially during uncertain
situations (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006). However, it is unknown
whether the predictive value of advice modulates attention
allocation, and consequently P3a amplitudes, during reward
and punishment feedback. The P3b component has been sug-
gested to underlie the adaptation of behavior in subsequent
trials by means of updating one’s internal prediction model
on the basis of current reward or punishment feedback
(Fischer & Ullsperger, 2013; Polich, 2007). Studies have in-
dicated that changes in behavior associated with learning and
optimizing decision making are paralleled by larger P3b am-
plitudes (Chase, Swainson, Durham, Benham, & Cools, 2011;
Fischer & Ullsperger, 2013).
The FRN, P3a, and P3b are thus thought to reflect different
aspectsunderlying feedback processing. FMRI studies have
provided evidence that activity in the networks associated
with these ERPs is influenced by advice during decision mak-
ing (Meshi et al., 2012). However, the extent to which advice
actually affects these electrophysiological components of
feedback processing remains unclear. Although some studies
have investigated the ERP components directly related to the
presentation of an advice cue (Chen, Wu, Tong, Guan, &
Zhou, 2012; Kim, Liss, Rao, Singer, & Compton, 2012;
Kimura & Katayama, 2013; Shestakova et al., 2013;
Trautmann-Lengsfeld & Herrmann, 2013; Yu & Sun, 2013),
to date no study has investigated the effects of advice cues on
the ERP components of subsequent feedback processing. If
people are to accurately use advice during decision making,
the advice needs to be validated and its usefulness—that is,
whether the advice is predictive of subsequent gains or
losses—needs to be determined. It is therefore possible that
feedback- and attention-related electro-cortical components
are susceptible to advice cues.
The present study consisted of two experiments aimed at
delineating the relation between advice cues and the processes
related to feedback and attention. In the first experiment, the
effects of advice cues on performance and ERPs were inves-
tigated during a forced choice reward–punishment task. We
hypothesized that expert cues would be perceived as more
predictive than nonexpert cues. Furthermore, we expected that
this difference in perceived predictiveness would be reflected
in the subsequent feedback-processing ERP components.
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Specifically, feedback following more predictive cues would
be of more importance for making successful choices.
Therefore, we hypothesized that advice cues viewed as being
more predictive would increase mismatch detection and direct
attention toward the feedback, as revealed by larger FRN and
P300 amplitudes.
In the second experiment, cathodal transcranial direct cur-
rent stimulation (ctDCS) targeting the OFC was applied dur-
ing the forced choice reward–punishment task, in order to
directly manipulate decision making on the basis of advice
cues and the associated feedback-related brain potentials.
Transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) has been shown
to be effective in modulating both cortical physiological ac-
tivity (Nitsche et al., 2003; Nitsche & Paulus, 2000, 2001) and
cognitive performance (for a review, see Kuo & Nitsche,
2015). Because the OFC is related to processing of the sub-
jective valuation of advice cues (Meshi et al., 2012), we hy-
pothesized that ctDCS-related interference with OFC activity
would decrease the subjective biases toward the advice cues.
As a result, the percentage following of advice cues in this
case would be closer to chance level. Additionally, we ex-
plored the effects of online ctDCS on feedback-related
ERPs. Because our hypothesis in the first experiment had
stated that increased FRN and P300 amplitudes are related to
increased advice following, we expected to find a decrease in
FRN and P300 amplitudes during ctDCS.
Experiment 1
Materials and method
Participants
Twenty-one right-handed participants with (corrected-
to-)normal vision and no history of neurological or psychiatric
disorders participated in Experiment 1 (12 female, nine males;
mean age ± SD: 22.67 ± 3.18 years). The study protocol was
approved by the Committee on Research Involving Human
Subjects of the Radboud University Medical Centre.
Experimental design and procedure
In each trial of the decision-making task, two neutral objects
of the same type (vases) were presented on a black screen (22-
in., 30 × 48 cm; resolution: 1,024 × 768), and participants
were asked to indicate which was more expensive. The par-
ticipants were placed approximately 80 cm from the screen,
and the objects (resolution 350 × 250 pixels) were presented
5 cm to the left and right of the screen’s center point, on a
white background. In every trial different vases were shown (a
total of 240 vases), so as to prevent learning effects. After the
objects had appeared, one of three advice cues was randomly
presented, indicated by a red frame (1-cm width) surrounding
the picture. Participants were informed that the advice cue
represented the choice of a group of participants from a pre-
vious study. Three types of cues were used—Bnovices,^
Bamateurs,^ and Bexperts^—with the labels being shown
above the red frame. The level of expertise was manipulated
by informing participants that the experts had attained high
scores on this task, whereas the novices had low scores.
However, participants were free to use any decision strategy.
Although advice information purposely implied that follow-
ing the expert cues was better than following the novice cues,
in reality the predictive value of each cue was at chance level.
The objects were shown for maximally 2,500 ms, and the cue
appeared after the first 500 ms. This means that the partici-
pants had a maximum of 2,000 ms to make a decision by
pressing either the left or the right button with their index
finger (Fig. 1). Subsequently, the participants received points
that reflected monetary rewards. The points ranged from – 40
(punishment) to + 50 (reward) in steps of 10. When the par-
ticipants did not respond within 2,000 ms, a message with the
text Bfaster^ appeared. The outline of a single trial is shown in
Fig. 1. To prevent participants from realizing that the advice
cue information was random, they were informed that the
points that they received were relative to the points they would
have received if they had opted for the alternative. Since the
number of points for this alternative was not presented, par-
ticipants were kept uncertain about the actual correctness of
their choice. A total of 120 trials were presented, with 40 trials
for each advice cue and an intertrial interval of 100–1,000 ms.
Data from the behavioral task were stored for offline analysis
using the Presentation software (Neurobehavioral systems,
Berkeley, CA, USA).
To study the underlying ERP components of advice infor-
mation processing, EEG measurements were performed dur-
ing the task. After participants had been informed about the
task, EEG electrodes were placed. Then participants per-
formed the decision-making task for approximately 10 min,
after which the electrodes were removed and participants were
debriefed.
Electroencephalography recording
EEG was recorded continuously during the task using an on-
line 0.1- to 70-Hz band-pass filter with a sampling rate of
1000 Hz on a passive 64-channel EASYCAP with a transcra-
nial magnetic stimulation multitrode system (EASYCAP
GmbH, Herrsching, Germany). Recordings were made from
a selection of 13 resin-covered sintered Ag/AgCl electrodes
(F3, F1, Fz, F2, F4, P3, Pz, P4, T7, T8, O1, Oz, O2), shown in
Fig. 1. The reference electrode was positioned on the left
mastoid, and the ground electrode was placed at POz.
Furthermore, a vertical electro-oculogram was recorded from
electrodes above and below the left eye, and a horizontal
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electro-oculogram was recorded from electrodes at the outer
canthi of both eyes. Raw EEG data were recorded and stored
for offline analysis using BrainVision Analyzer 2.0 (Brain
Products GmbH, München, Germany).
Data reduction and processing
Advice information processing For each participant, the per-
centages of following the novice, amateur, and expert cues
were calculated. To determine how informative each cue
was experienced to be by the participants, the subjective pre-
dictive value (SPV) was calculated. This value is the absolute
difference between the percentage following and chance level
(50%). Therefore, the SPV is a value between 0 and 50, with
larger numbers representing higher subjective information
value. For example, if a cue is followed on either 100% or
0% of trials, the SPVwould be 50. This wouldmean that these
cues were highly informative, since participants either follow-
ed or opposed the cue at all times, whereas an SPVof 0 would
imply that the cue was uninformative to the participant, and
thus was followed at chance level.
ERP data analysis All EEG recordings were offline band-pass
filtered between 1.5 and 30 Hz (48 dB/Octave) and referenced
to the mastoid. ERPs of 1,000 ms were segmented time-
locked to the moment at which participant had received feed-
back immediately following the decision. Epochs were
baseline-corrected using the – 100-ms to 0-ms window.
Ocular artifacts were controlled using the Gratton and Coles
algorithm (Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1983). Additional
artifacts were removed automatically if the peak-to-peak dif-
ferences exceeded 100 μVor were below 0.5 μV, followed by
visual inspection of the data. The remaining epochs were av-
eraged separately for (1) reward versus punishment and (2)
novice versus amateur versus expert trials. All ERP results
were analyzed at the Pz electrode. This electrode was chosen
in order to compare the findings with experiments in which
only the Pz electrode was investigated (see the ERP Data
Analysis section of Exp. 2 and Supplementary Table 1). The
ERPs recorded at the other channels are displayed in
Supplementary Figs. S1 and S2.
Statistical analysis
Expert information processing was measured by the number
of advice cues followed during the decision-making task.
Generalized linear model (GLM) repeated measures analyses
of variance (ANOVAs), with the dependent variables percent-
age following cues and reaction time, were used to investigate
how the advice cues influenced decision making. Significant
results were followed by Bonferroni-corrected paired-samples
t tests. Additionally, in a post hoc test, the SPV values were
tested against a test value of 0 (indicating no predictive value).
ERP components were investigated using GLM repeated
measures ANOVAs in the time windows of the FRN (200–
300 ms; Gentsch, Ullsperger, & Ullsperger, 2009), the P3a
(350–400 ms; Muller-Gass, Macdonald, Schrönger,
Sculthorpe, & Campbell, 2007), and the P3b (450–600 ms;
Calvo & Beltrán, 2014). Significant results were followed by
an exploratory analysis in which the time course of a
Fig. 1 (Left) Overview of one trials. In total, 120 trials were presented, with a jittered intertrial interval of 100–1,000 ms. The total duration of the task
was approximately 10 min. (Right) EEG setup of Experiment 1 (electrodes), and tDCS-EEG setup of Experiment 2 (blue: cathode, red: anode)
252 Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci (2018) 18:249–262
significant difference was made by plotting the p value every
4 ms within the investigated time window.
All statistical analyses were performed using IBM SPSS
22.0, and the statistical level of significance was set to α < .05
(two-tailed). All analyses were checked for normality, and
Mauchly’s test was used to examine the assumption of sphe-
ricity. A Greenhouse–Geisser correction was used if this as-
sumption was violated. All averages are represented as means
± SEMs.
Results
Advice cue processing
Participants chose the left vase in 50.59 ± 1.16% of trials,
and the right vase in 48.89 ± 1.09% of trials, which did not
differ significantly [t(20) = 0.76, p = .45], and responses
occurred too late in 0.51 ± 0.30% of trials. A significant
difference was observed between percentages following the
three advice cues [F(2, 40) = 31.91, p < .001]. On average,
participants followed novices in 33.41 ± 4.23% of trials,
amateurs in 37.80 ± 3.26%, and experts in 76.10 ±
4.22%. Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons revealed
that experts were followed significantly more than both
novices [t(20) = 6.11, p < .001] and amateurs [t(20) =
6.31, p < .001], but the percentages following novices
and amateurs were not different (Fig. 2a). Furthermore,
we tested whether the SPVs—that is, the absolute differ-
ences from chance level (50%)—were significantly greater
than zero. Consequently, Bonferroni-corrected one-sample t
tests were performed, and the SPVs of all cues [novice:
SPV = 16.59, t(20) = 3.82, p = .003; amateur: SPV =
12.20, t(20) = 3.75, p = .003; expert: SPV = 26.10, t(20)
= 6.18, p < .001] were significantly different from chance
level (Fig. 2a). Expert cues were subjectively perceived as
being most predictive, whereas amateur cues were seen as
least predictive. Interestingly, the SPVs were significantly
positively correlated between all three conditions (novice–
amateur, r = .507, p = .019; novice–expert, r = .529, p =
.014; amateur–expert, r = .508, p = .019). This suggest that
participants who relied more on advice information in one
condition also relied more on advice information in another
condition.
Decision times differed significantly between the advice cue
categories, as well [F(2, 20) = 19.00, p < .001]. Bonferroni-
corrected pairwise comparisons revealed that during expert tri-
als decisions were made significantly faster than during either
novice trials [t(20) = 7.02, p < .001] or amateur trials [t(20) =
4.60, p = .001]. No difference was observed between novice
and amateur trials [t(20) = 0.08, p = .936] (Fig. 2b).
Furthermore, no correlation between the averaged decision
times and averaged SPVs was found (r = – .186, p = .420).
Reward and punishment ERPs
A significant difference for the P3b component was observed
between reward and punishment trials [Pz,F(1, 20) = 5.99, p =
.024; Figs. 3a, b], specifically in a time window of 492–
588 ms (Fig. 3c). No significant difference between reward
and punishment trials was observed for the FRN [Pz, F(1, 20)
= 0.01, p = .965] or the P3a [Pz, F(1, 20) = 0.01, p = .934].
Similar results were observed for electrodes P3 and P4, but no
differences between reward and punishment trials were found
in other electrodes (Supplementary Fig. S1).
Advice cue ERPs
Analysis of ERPs segmented for different advice cues re-
vealed a trend toward significance at the P3a component
[F(2, 40) = 3.30, p = .047; Fig. 3d]. Indeed, analysis of the
time points within the P3a window revealed a significant ef-
fect between 366 and 386 ms (Fig. 3e). Bonferroni-correct
post hoc comparisons revealed a significantly larger P3a am-
plitudes in response to expert than to amateur cues [t(20) =
Fig. 2 (a) Percentages of advice following for novice, amateur, and
expert cues in Experiment 1. Percentages following were compared
between different cue types and to chance level (50%). (b) Decision
times for each of the three advice cues. Asterisks indicate significant
results after Bonferroni correction (p < .05)
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2.73, p = .039; Fig. 3f]. The novice–expert and novice–ama-
teur differences in ERP signals did not reach significance. The
modulation of the P3a component concurred with the differ-
ences in SPVs (Fig. 3f). No effect of advice cues was found on
the FRN [F(2, 40) = 2.43, p = .101] or the P3b [F(2, 40) =
0.20, p = .822].
Experiment 2
Indeed, Reinhart and Woodman (2014) have shown that FRN
amplitudes are decreased and error positivities are increased
after offline cathodal tDCS (ctDCS), and that both are
associated with reduced behavioral adjustments after errors.
Here we explored the effects of online ctDCS on feedback-
related ERPs. On the basis of Experiment 1, we therefore
expected P3a amplitudes to be decreased. Furthermore, in
accordance with the findings of Reinhart and Woodman, a
decrease in FRN amplitudes was also expected.
Materials and method
Participants
Thirty right-handed participants took part in Experiment 2 (19
female, 11 male; mean age ± SD: 22.13 ± 3.50 years), none of
Fig. 3 (a) ERP responses time-locked to reinforcement feedback imme-
diately after decision making for reward and punishment trials in
Experiment 1. (b & c) P3b amplitudes (b) and time course (c) in the
interval 450–600 ms after feedback onset for reward and punishment
trials. (d) ERP responses time-locked to reinforcement feedback
immediately after decision making for different advice cues in
Experiment 1. (e) Time course of the differences between advice cues
within the P3a. (f) P3a amplitudes 350–400 ms after feedback onset for
advice cues (left y-axis). The gray bars in panel F reflect the SPV for each
cue (right y-axis). Asterisks indicate significant effects (p < .05)
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whom had participated in Experiment 1. All participants had
normal or corrected-to-normal vision and no history of neuro-
logical or psychiatric disorders.
Experimental design and procedure
During this experiment the same behavioral task was utilized,
during which sham and cathodal stimulation were applied in a
double-blindwithin-subjects design. Because participants per-
formed in two sessions, the original behavioral task (with
vases) was presented once, and in the other session the same
behavioral task was used with other neutral objects (lamps).
The order of the stimulation and behavioral task objects was
randomized. To control for effects of diurnal rhythms, both
sessions started at the same time of day (Ridding & Ziemann,
2010). To prevent carryover effects, the sessions were spaced
7 days apart (Nitsche & Paulus, 2001).
The procedure was similar to that of Experiment 1, with the
exception that ctDCS was applied during the task, which was
turned on 4 min prior to the beginning of the task and lasted
throughout the task’s duration.
Transcranial direct current stimulation
TDCS was delivered with a battery-driven constant-current
stimulator (DC stimulator, NeuroConn GmbH, Ilmenau,
Germany), using two rubber electrodes in saline-soaked
sponges. Additional conductive gel was used to improve con-
ductivity between the electrodes and the scalp and to avoid
bridging between EEG sensors. In addition, the EEG sensors
were protected by a resin cover. The active tDCS electrode (5
× 7 cm) was placed horizontally over Fpz, whereas the refer-
ence electrode (10 × 10 cm) was placed over Cz (Manuel
et al., 2014) Stimulation was applied at an intensity of
1.0 mA (current density active: 0.029 mA/cm2; reference:
0.01 mA/cm2), which is within the bounds of tDCS safety
guidelines (Nitsche et al., 2008). The electrode impedance
was kept below 10 kΩ during the stimulation period.
Active ctDCS was applied for approximately 14 min from
4min before the onset of the behavioral task, to ensure that the
effects of stimulation would be maximal at the start of the
behavioral task (Manuel, David, Bikson, & Schnider, 2014;
Nitsche & Paulus, 2000). During the fade-in period, the cur-
rent was gradually increased over 30 s (Zaehle, Sandmann,
Thorne, Jäncke, & Herrmann, 2011). During sham tDCS, a
current was applied for only 30 s using the samemontage as in
the active ctDCS condition, which has been shown to success-
fully blind participants (Gandiga, Hummel, & Cohen, 2006).
All participants underwent both the active and sham stimula-
tion conditions. After each session, participants were asked to
indicate whether the tDCS had felt unpleasant. Also, to ensure
successful blinding, participants were asked to indicate in
which of the two conditions they had received active
stimulation.
Electroencephalography recording
The EEG apparatus, setup, and recording were the same as in
Experiment 1.
ERP data analysis
EEG data preparation and analysis were performed in the
same way as in Experiment 1. The preprocessing steps were
standardized across the two experiments. In both experiments
the same criteria for removing artifacts were used (automatic
removal of peak-to-peak differences above 100 μVand below
0.5 μV, followed by visual inspection). This was done in order
to avoid any quality differences in the recorded EEG signals
between the experiments. Due to the proximity between the
EEG and tDCS electrodes, a considerable amount of clipping
or high-intensity noise was observed in frontal electrodes. The
participant’s data from a single channel were excluded if more
than 50% of the epochs were rejected. As a result, the Fz
electrode was excluded from further analyses because 23 par-
ticipants (77%) met this criterion. For electrode Pz, the data
from seven participants were excluded, and the data of the
remaining 23 participants were analyzed and are reported
here. To compare data quality between the sham and active
ctDCS conditions, the percentages of removed segments,
based on the above-mentioned artifact removal criteria, were
compared. From the remaining 23 participants, on average
3.83 ± 1.98% of the segments were removed in the sham
condition, and 4.56 ± 1.56% of segments were removed in
the ctDCS condition. A within-subjects ANOVA did not re-
veal a significant difference in the percentages of trials re-
moved [F(1, 22) = 0.10, p = .755]. For the main analysis,
the artifact-free epochs were averaged separately for (1) re-
ward versus punishment, (2) novice versus amateur versus
expert, and (3) sham versus cathodal tDCS trials.
To investigate changes in oscillatory activity, an explorato-
ry time–frequency analysis was performed by using the fast-
Fourier-transformed power spectra of single-trial EEG data
using complex Morlet wavelets, using 30 logarithmically in-
creasing steps between 1.5 and 10 Hz. All ERP results were
analyzed at the Pz electrode. Other electrodes of interest were
not taken into account because of the large amount of data loss
(Supplementary Table 1).
Statistical analysis
The effects of ctDCS on the percentages following cues and
the reaction times were investigated using GLM repeated
measures ANOVAs. To check for a test–retest effect between
sessions, a repeated measures ANOVA was performed, with
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session number as an independent variable and the percentage
following of cues as the dependent variable. All comparisons
between ERP components (reward vs. punishment,
BRewPun^; novice vs. amateur vs. expert, BCueType^; sham
vs. real, BStim^), as well as any interaction effects, were ana-
lyzed using GLM repeated measures ANOVA analyses for the
FRN (200–300 ms), P3a (350–400 ms), and P3b (450–600
ms). For the spectral analysis of evoked power, a time window
of interest between 200 and 500 ms was selected, at which the
FRN and P300 were observed (Cohen, Elger, & Ranganath,
2007; Wischnewski & Schutter, 2017). Paired-samples t tests
were performed to test the difference between sham and active
ctDCS for reward and punishment trials separately in the win-
dows of 2.5–4.0, 4.0–5.5, and 5.5– 7.0 Hz. Because this was
an exploratory analysis, no multiple-comparison correction
was performed.
All statistical analyses were performed using IBMSPSS 22.0,
and the statistical level of significance was set to α < .05 (two
tailed). All analyses were checked for normality, and Mauchly’s
test was used to examine the assumption of sphericity. A
Greenhouse–Geisser correction was used if this assumption
was violated. All averages are represented as means ± SEMs.
Results
The stimulation was tolerated well, and only one participant
reported mild discomfort (a constant itching sensation). Due
to tDCS-related artifacts, the ERP data from electrode Pz
could not be analyzed in seven participants (Supplementary
Table 1). Other electrodes of interest were not taken into ac-
count because of large amounts of data loss. The blinding of
real versus sham tDCS was successful (43.3% correct; χ2 =
1.80, p = .180).
Effect of ctDCS on advice processing
In the sham condition, participants chose the left vase in 48.44
± 1.02% of trials and the right vase in 51.36 ± 1.05% of trials,
which did not differ significantly [t(29) = 1.41, p = .17], and
made responses too late in 0.19 ± 0.08% of trials. In the ctDCS
condition, participants chose the left vase in 48.61 ± 0.87% of
trials and the right vase in 50.97 ± 0.87% of trials, which also
did not differ significantly [t(29) = 0.76, p = .45], and
responded too late in 0.42 ± 0.14% of trials. GLM repeated
measures ANOVA revealed an effect of advice information on
decision making [F(2, 58) = 46.24, p < .001]. On average,
participants followed novices in 38.60 ± 3.50% of trials, am-
ateurs in 46.67 ± 2.76%, and experts in 77.57 ± 2.66%. As in
Experiment 1, Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons
showed that participants followed the experts significantly
more than either the novices [t(29) = 7.65, p < .001] or the
amateurs [t(29) = 8.64, p < .001], but no significant difference
was observed between novices and amateurs (Fig. 4a).
Bonferroni-corrected one-sample t tests showed that the SPV
of novice cues in the sham condition [t(29) = – 3.47, p = .030],
as well as the SPVs of expert cues in both the sham [t(29) =
8.60, p < .001] and active ctDCS [t(29) = 10.23, p < .001]
conditions were significantly different from chance level. No
deviations from chance level were observed after amateur or
novice cues during active ctDCS. No main effect of ctDCS
condition was found, nor was there an interaction effect be-
tween type of cue and stimulation (Fig. 4a). Furthermore, the
results cannot be explained by a test–retest effect, because
percentage-following behavior did not differ significantly be-
tween the first and second sessions [F(2, 58) = 0.66, p = .421].
Decision times also differed significantly between the ad-
vice cue categories [F(2, 50) = 18.64, p < .001]. Bonferroni-
corrected pairwise comparisons showed that during expert
trials, decision times were significantly faster than during both
novice trials [t(29) = 4.59, p < .001] and amateur trials [t(29) =
Fig. 4 (a) Percentages of advice following for novice, amateur, and
expert cues during the sham and ctDCS conditions in Experiment 2.
Percentages following were compared between the different cue types,
between sham and active stimulation, and to chance level (50%). (b)
Decision times during the sham and ctDCS conditions for each of the
three advice cues. Asterisks indicate significant results after Bonferroni
correction (p < .05)
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4.49, p = .001], with no difference between novice and ama-
teur trials. Reaction times did not differ between sham and
active ctDCS, nor was there an interaction effect between type
of cue and stimulation (Fig. 4b). In sum, frontal ctDCS did not
influence the use of advice as compared to sham.
Effect of ctDCS on reward and punishment ERPs
As in Experiment 1, analysis of the feedback-locked ERPs re-
vealed a significant effect of RewPun for the P3b [F(1, 22) =
12.73, p = .001; Fig. 5a]. This effect was specific to a time
window between 472 and 568 ms, with reward feedback
inducing larger P3b amplitudes than did punishment feedback
(Fig. 5c). No significant RewPun effect was observed for the
FRN [F(1, 22) = 0.87, p = .361] or the P3a [F(1, 22) = 0.62, p
= .438].
A significant main effect of Stim (ctDCS vs. sham) was
observed for the FRN [on average, F(1, 22) = 4.75, p = .040;
Fig. 5a]. As compared to sham, ctDCS decreased the ampli-
tude of the FRN in the window between 248 and 272 ms (Fig.
5b). No significant Stim effect was observed for the P3a [F(1,
22) = 1.55, p = .226] or the P3b [F(1, 22) = 0.03, p = .862].
Also, no significant RewPun × Stim interaction was found for
the FRN [F(1, 22) = 0.34, p = .566], P3a [F(1, 22) = 0.52, p =
Fig. 5 (a) ERP responses time-locked to reinforcement feedback imme-
diately after decision making during sham versus ctDCS in Experiment 2.
The asterisk indicates a significant effect of RewPun, and the dagger
indicates a significant effect of Stim (ps < .05). (b) Time course (200–
300 ms after feedback onset) of the Stim effect. (c) Time course (450–
600 ms after feedback onset) of the RewPun effect. (d) ERP responses
time-locked to reinforcement feedback for different advice cues during
sham versus ctDCS in Experiment 2. (e & f) P3a amplitudes (350–400
ms) for advice cues (left y-axes), with gray bars reflecting the SPV (right
y-axes), during (e) sham stimulation and (f) active ctDCS
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.477], or P3b [F(1, 22) = 1.07, p = .314]. The difference in
FRN amplitudes between active and sham ctDCS was not
significantly correlated with overall percentages following (r
= .044, p = .842), response times (r = – .202, p = .354), or
overall SPVs (r = – .089, p = .686).
Furthermore, the mean standard deviations of the ERP
signals between 0 and 600 ms were comparable across
conditions. In the sham condition, the average standard
deviations were 13.19 ± 0.34 μV for the punishment con-
dition and 13.12 ± 0.46 μV for the reward condition. In
the active ctDCS condition, the average standard devia-
tion for the punishment condition was 13.81 ± 0.64 μV,
and that for the reward condition was 14.05 ± 0.64 μV. A
2×2 within-subjects ANOVA revealed no significant dif-
ferences between stimulation conditions [F(1, 22) = 1.24,
p = .278], nor between reward and punishment [F(1, 22) =
0.19, p = .670], nor an interaction effect [F(1, 22) = 0.97,
p = .335]. This suggests that the noise levels did not differ
between real and sham ctDCS.
Effect of ctDCS on advice cue ERPs
CueType did not affect P3a amplitudes significantly [F(2, 44)
= 0.45, p = .639; Fig. 5d]. However, during sham tDCS the
P3a component did show a trend toward modulation by sub-
jective predictive value comparable to that found in
Experiment 1 (Fig. 5e), even though the difference between
the P3a amplitudes of amateur and expert cues did not reach
statistical significance (p = .066). Similar though more vari-
able results were observed in the ctDCS condition, indicating
that active stimulation did not significantly alter P3a ampli-
tudes (Fig. 5f). As in Experiment 1, no effect of CueType was
found on the FRN [F(2, 44) = 0.80, p = .454] or the P3b [F(2,
44) = 0.52, p = .596].
As with the reward and punishment trials, a trend toward
decreased FRN amplitudes after ctDCS as compared to sham
was observed, but this did not reach significance [F(1, 22) =
3.12, p = .090]. No Stim effect was found for the P3a [F(1, 22)
= 2.26, p = .146] or the P3b [F(1, 22) = 0.32, p = .579].
No interaction effect of CueType × Stim was observed in
the FRN [F(2, 44) = 0.42, p = .657], P3a [F(2, 44) = 0.36, p =
.703], or P3b [F(2, 44) = 0.43, p = .655].
Effect of ctDCS on evoked power
An exploratory analysis of event-locked data in the time–fre-
quency domain revealed that real as compared to sham tDCS
decreased the activity between 4 and 5.5 Hz in a time window
of 200–500 ms after feedback onset (Fig. 6). However, this
effect was only observed in reward [F(1, 22) = 6.52, p = .018]
and not in punishment [F(1, 22) = 0.78, p = .387] trials.
Discussion
When individuals experience outcome uncertainty during deci-
sion making, they tend to rely on advice that may contain
relevant information that contributes to a positive outcome.
As such, expert advice is consideredmore credible at face value
than advice by nonexperts (Harvey & Fischer, 1997; Van Swol
& Sniezek, 2005). In the first experiment we showed that dur-
ing uncertainty, expert advice is indeed followed significantly
more often than amateur and novice advice. Furthermore, par-
ticipants responded significantly faster to cues that were per-
ceived as being more informative, which is in accordance with
previous findings (Klucharev et al., 2011; Meshi et al., 2012).
These observations are in accordance with the prospect
theory of decision making (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
Kahneman and Tversky proposed that feedback signals are
used to form an internal inference model (heuristic) to predict
which choices will yield expected, better than expected, or
worse than expected outcomes. However, uninformative feed-
back lacks predictive power and introduces uncertainty, and
consequently contextual framing effects strongly influence
decision making (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). Due to the
low predictability of the reward and punishment feedback,
participants start to rely on alternative cues to guide their de-
cisions. In other words, because the reward–punishment feed-
back cannot be used to form an internal prediction model,
participants will become more sensitive to expert advice.
Our first finding was that the FRN was not modulated by
feedback cues. The FRN is thought to reflect the discrepancy
between predicted and actual outcomes (Holroyd & Coles,
2002). The absence of effects therefore suggests that predic-
tion–outcome mismatch detection is unaffected by advice cues.
Importantly, since reward and punishment feedback was pre-
sented randomly, participants were not able to form a reliable
internal prediction model. As a result, brain signals related to
the detection of anticipated versus actual outcomes were not be
expected. This is also underlined by the observation that no
effect of valence was observed in the FRN. Several studies have
suggested that the FRN is affected by valence, with larger am-
plitudes for negative than for positive feedback (Bellebaum
et al., 2010; Wu & Zhou, 2009). Hence, the FRN may distin-
guish between better- and worse-than-expected outcomes
(Alexander & Brown, 2011; Bellebaum et al., 2010;
Ullsperger et al., 2014). The absence of a valence effect in this
study points toward the absence of a reliable prediction model.
In accordance with prospect theory, during the absence of a
reliable internal model, no errors in prediction will be ob-
served, and individuals will rely strongly on external cues
instead. Our results showed that, in contrast to the FRN, P3a
amplitudes did seem to be affected by advice cues. This may
suggest that the subjectively perceived predictability of a cue
may be reflected by a change in the P3a amplitude. The least
informative amateur’s advice showed the smallest P3a
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amplitude, whereas the most informative expert cues showed
the largest P3a amplitude. Previous studies have shown that
the P3a amplitude is associated with the allocation of atten-
tional resources (Polich, 2007). Furthermore, Kopp et al.
(2016) showed that P3a amplitudes increase with higher cer-
tainty as more attention is allocated toward information that is
subjectively perceived as being the most valid. In our study,
participants’ certainty depended on the SPV of each advice
cue, since the reward and punishment feedback signals were
randomly given and thus uninformative. In this context, expert
advice is considered to be more reliable than amateur advice,
which yields increased attention toward the feedback.
Importantly, although the results for the P3a in the second
experiment pointed in the same direction, differences between
the expert and amateur cues did not reach significance (p =
.066, two-tailed). The interpretation of the P3a results is there-
fore tentative and needs to be further explored in future
investigations.
In contrast to the P3a component, the P3b was not affected
by the SPV of each cue. This is in line with the idea that no
internal prediction model was generated, and hence no
updating occurred—which is associated with the P3b ampli-
tude—could have occurred. Since the reward and punishment
feedback was not predictive, the advice cues were perceived
as the primary source of information, and since the cues
remained the same over time, no additional learning and,
hence, prediction model updating occurred (Chase et al.,
2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). This is supported by
the observation that participants showed no difference in fol-
lowing advice cues between sessions in the second
experiment.
In the second experiment we investigated the contributions
of the frontal reward–punishment network that underlie these
electrophysiological components by using concurrent ctDCS
and EEG. Reinhart and Woodman (2014) showed that offline
frontal ctDCS prior to a decision-making task decreases FRN
amplitudes and was related to slower learning rates. This sug-
gests that by decreasing the FRN, and hence the detection of
prediction errors, the generation of internal predictions models
was hindered. Here we showed that the FRN amplitude is also
decreased during ctDCS. Furthermore, in our study the
ctDCS-induced decrease in the FRN did not influence deci-
sion making, further suggesting that the participants tended to
rely on the advice and not on reward–punishment feedback. It
should also be noted that contrary to Reinhart and Woodman,
we investigated the online effects of simultaneous tDCS on
the electrophysiological components. Our study therefore pro-
vides evidence that tDCS can directly affect the FRN, which is
not necessarily related to plasticity effects in the underlying
cortical tissue. Previous studies have linked the FRN to activ-
ity in the theta band (Cavanagh et al., 2014; Hajihosseini &
Holroyd, 2013), and it has previously been shown that in-
creased learning speeds are associated with decreased theta
activity (Cavanagh, Frank, Klein, & Allen, 2010; Mas-
Herrero & Marco-Pallares, 2014; Wischnewski, Zerr, &
Schutter, 2016). Indeed, a significant decrease in theta activity
in reward trials was observed after ctDCS.
Notably, ctDCS did not modulate the P3a amplitude, which
may have been due to the tDCSmontage, whichmay not have
targeted the actual neural generator of the P3a component.
Another explanation is that ctDCS did target the intended
neuronal population for generating the P3a, but that the phys-
iological effects were too small to cause a measurable change
in amplitude and behavior. It should be noted, however, that
the currently used tDCS montage has been shown to cover a
significant portion of the frontal cortex, including the OFC
and medial frontal cortex (Manuel et al., 2014). P3a source-
localizing studies have identified a broad network within
Fig. 6 Frequency spectrum plots time-locked to reinforcement feedback
immediately after decision making in Experiment 2. In the upper panels,
the time–frequency plots are shown for reward trials during sham (left)
and active (middle) stimulation, as well as the activity difference (right).
In the lower panels, the same plots are shown for punishment trials. The
boxes indicate a significant difference between active and sham stimula-
tion (p < .05)
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frontal, parietal, and cingulate areas (Sabeti, Katebi, Rastgar,
&Azimifar, 2016; Volpe et al., 2007) that broadly corresponds
to the so-called fronto-parietal attention network
(Szczepanski, Pinsk, Douglas, Kastner, & Saalmann, 2013).
Although there seems to be considerable overlap between the
areas underlying P3a generation and the area being stimulated
here with ctDCS, it is unknown whether this montage actually
targets the critical subregions and networks. Furthermore,
meta-analyses have shown that tDCS effects on cognition
are subtle, with a small-to-moderate effect size at best
(Dedoncker, Brunoni, Baeken, & Vanderhasselt, 2016;
Jacobson, Koslowsky, & Lavidor, 2012). So, whereas
ctDCS did influence FRN activity, the P3a was not modulated
by the current tDCSmontage. As indicated by the observation
that the ctDCS-induced change in the FRN was not related to
any ctDCS-induced behavioral changes, the FRN does not
seem to be part of the subjective valuation of advice cues.
However, because the present study was not designed to pro-
vide evidence for this null hypothesis, more research will be
needed to shed light on whether or not a relationship between
the FRN and advice taking exists.
Finally, several limitations should be mentioned. First, the
presentation of feedback immediately followed the partici-
pant’s button response. This response was given by a button
press of the left or right index finger, which may have evoked
movement-related potentials in electrodes near the primary
motor cortex, specifically C3 and C4. Unfortunately, EEG
was not recorded from the C3 and C4 electrodes due to the
size of the return electrode. Even though possible contribu-
tions of movement-related potentials cannot be completely
excluded, due to the equal distributions of left and right re-
sponses, it not likely that movement-related potentials would
have affected recording from more posterior electrode loca-
tions such as the Pz. Second, due to the relatively small num-
ber of trials, no interaction between reward/punishment and
advice cue on the ERP signals could be analyzed. However,
since the effects of advice cues and reward versus punishment
were observed in different time windows (350–400 and 450–
600 ms, respectively) no interaction effect was expected.
Third, the present study suggests that the FRN and P3b have
no direct involvement in the processing of advice cues, since
decision-making behavior itself was not affected by the
ctDCS. The behavioral changes that are associated with
FRN modulation using the present ctDCS montage cannot
be answered by the present study, because in this study no
learning task was used. Finally, combining EEG and tDCS
in the present montage was challenging, and due to a low
signal-to-noise ratio at the frontal electrodes, we could not
analyze the full EEG recordings (Mancini et al., 2015).
Channels were excluded if more than 50% of epochs were
rejected. Electrode Fz, at which the FRN component is typi-
cally measured (Baker & Holroyd, 2011), had to be rejected in
77% of the participants. Therefore, the FRN component was
analyzed at the Pz electrode. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first study to have investigated feedback-related
ERP components during tDCS, and despite the suboptimal
scalp location, a clear negativity was observed between 200
and 300 ms after feedback onset. In addition to a decreased
signal-to-noise ratio, a blood pulsation artifact was observed at
around 1 Hz (Noury, Hipp, & Siegel, 2016), and therefore a
high-pass filter of 1.5 Hz was used, which did not affect the
observed difference in the FRNs between real and sham stim-
ulation (Supplementary Fig. S3).
Conclusion
The present study has shown that during uncertainty, partici-
pants direct their attention to expert advice. On the electro-
physiological level, this is evidenced by a larger P3a during
subsequent reward- and punishment-related feedback process-
ing. Other components, such as the FRN and P3b, were not
affected by advice cues. However, ctDCS targeting frontal
cortical areas decreased FRN amplitudes. This suggests that
advice cues can alter feedback-related electrocortical signals
by primarily affecting attentional processes, whereas the de-
tection of and adaptation to mismatches between a prediction
model and the actual outcome do not seem to be influenced.
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